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Forecasts are an inherent part of economic science and the quest for perfect foresight occupies economists 
and researchers in multiple fields. The release of economic forecasts (and its revisions) is a popular and 
often publicized event, with a multitude of institutions and think-tanks devoted almost exclusively to that 
task. The European Central  Bank (ECB) also publishes its forecasts for the euro area, however ECB’s 
forecast  accuracy  is  not  a  deeply  researched  theme.  The  ECB  forecasts’  accuracy  is  the  main  point 
developed in this paper, which tries to contribute to understand the nature of the errors committed by the 
ECB forecasts and its main differences compared to other projections. What we try to infer is whether the 
ECB is accurate in its projections, making less errors than the others, maybe due to some informational 
advantage.  We conclude  that the ECB  seems to consistently  underestimate the HICP inflation rate and 
overestimate  GDP  growth.  Comparing  it  with  the  others,  the  ECB  shows  a  superior  performance, 
committing almost always fewer errors. So, this signals a possible informational advantage from the ECB. 
Since the forecasting errors could jeopardize ECB’s credibility public criticism could be avoided if the ECB 
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1. Introduction 
 
Forecasts are an inherent part of economic science and the quest for perfect foresight 
occupies  economists  and  researchers  in  multiple  fields.  The  release  of  economic 
forecasts (and its revisions) is a popular and often publicized event, with a multitude of 
institutions and think-tanks devoted almost exclusively to that task.  
The European Central Bank (ECB) also publishes its forecasts for the euro area, namely 
in  terms  of  inflation  and  GDP  growth.  However,  ECB’s  forecast  accuracy  is  not  a 
deeply  researched  theme.  The  same  happens  for  almost  all  the  main  central  banks, 
maybe with the exceptions of the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England. The ECB 
forecasts’ accuracy is the main point developed in this paper, which tries to contribute 
to understand the nature of the errors committed by the ECB forecasts and its main 
differences compared to other projections. What we try to infer is whether the ECB is 
accurate  in  its  projections,  making  less  errors  than  the  others,  maybe  due  to  some 
informational advantage. To our knowledge, for the ECB this a question not previously 
researched in the literature.   
 
 
2. Communication as a monetary policy strategy  
 
The increased monetary policy openness observed throughout the world in recent years 
has been widely welcomed both by central bankers and by other economists. Central 
bank’s progress in this field enhances their monetary policy credibility and helps market 
participants  and  the  public  to  better  understand  the  decisions  that  are  taken.  If  the 
central bank possess an acute forecast performance then is able to take better decisions 
and deliver a more appropriate monetary policy. On the contrary, a central bank that 
consistently makes errors on its forecasts loses its credibility and is incapable to deliver 
an appropriate forward-looking policy. 
The literature on central bank communication has broadly followed the central bank 
independence literature mainly developed in the last twenty years, culminating in a new 
appreciation of the value of good communication as a companion to adequate policy 
actions (see Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2005). As stated by Blinder (2009, p. 5), central 
banks  talk  about  at  least  four  different  aspects  of  monetary  policy:  their  overall   4
objectives and strategy; the motives behind a particular policy decision; the economic 
outlook and future monetary policy decisions. The academic and policy literature on 
central  bank  communication  stresses  the  seminal  role  of  communication  for  the 
effectiveness  of  monetary  policy  [see,  e.g.,  Canzoneri  (1985),  King  (1997),  Blinder 
(1998)  and  Buiter  (1999)],  highlighting  the  various  possible  channels  to  convey 
information. 
As stated by Jansen and de Haan (2004, p. 5), the literature has identified, at least, three 
reasons why central banks can benefit from proper communication: i) communication 
may  increase  the  effectiveness  of  monetary  policy,  shaping  long  run  inflation 
expectations;  ii)  communication  may  be  used  to  reduce  noise  and  uncertainty  in 
financial markets; finally, iii) communication is necessary for an adequate central bank 
accountability.  So,  communication  can  help  inform  the  public’s  expectations  of  the 
future course of short term interest rates, providing the policymakers with increased 
influence over long term rates and hence a greater ability to achieve its macroeconomic 
objectives. That is, if the public can better comprehend and assess the central bank’s 
monetary  policy decisions, its trust in the bank’s ability to keep  inflation  on target 
increases. This in turn helps the central bank to anchor inflation expectations and steer 
market interest rates with longer maturities. At the same time, greater openness due to 
the disclosure of interest rate forecast puts the central bank under increased pressure to 
improve  the  quality  of  its  forecasting  system.  Nevertheless,  as  stated  by  Faust  and 
Leeper (2005), one of the strongest central banking taboos is the prohibition against 
talking publicly about future interest rates
1. Also, private entities may become over-
reliant on the central bank’s  projection, not  paying  sufficient attention  to their  own 
information and analyses and then considering themselves “deceived” if the announced 
rate path does not materialize. While there are cases in which statements could constrain 
future behavior, the mere conveyance of information – about the policy decision, the 
inflation target, the forecast, etc. – should not commit the central bank to any future 
action.     
Related  to  communication  we  have  transparency  that,  defined  as  the  absence  of 
asymmetric information between policy makers and the public, is an integral part of the 
required accountability for independent central banks [Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004, 
                                                              
1 As argued by Rudebusch and Williams (2006, p. 2), “This taboo largely arises from the belief that financial markets 
would be prone to interpret any central bank indications about the likely future path of policy as commitments to 
future action, as opposed to projections based on existing information and subject to considerable change. Thus, 
many central banks will at best only give indirect hints or use coded language about policy inclinations in order to 
retain a plausible deniability in case markets are disappointed as the future unfolds.”   5
p. 2)]. Even if a central bank publishes a lot of information, if that information is not 
understandable by the public it will not be  perceived as a transparent central bank. 
According to those authors, there are limits to how much information can be digested 
effectively, since too much information could crowd out the formation of private beliefs 
which  are  a  crucial  source  of  information  for  a  central  bank  and  thus  for  the 
effectiveness of monetary policy making
2. As stated by Ehrmann et al. (2010, p. 6), the 
assumption  of  imperfect  information  is  crucial for  central  bank  communication  and 
transparency.  Imperfect  information  generates  disagreements  among  forecasters, 
making the economy volatile. Via communication and transparency, central banks may 
anchor market expectations, reduce volatility in the economy, and thus achieve a better 
performance.  So,  the  quality  of  the  information  is  crucial  for  the  success  of  the 
communication  strategy.  A  poor  quality  of  the  information  could  give  conflicting 
signals  to  financial  markets,  prompting  possible  inadequate  responses.  Finally, 
communication  requires  credibility  and  a  robust  historical  record  from  monetary 
authorities. 
But, how can central bank communication serve has a monetary policy instrument? The 
traditional  assumption  when  analyzing  and  predicting  monetary  policy  decisions  is 
based on the idea that economic agents form expectations on the basis of a full set of 
available  economic  data  and  that  central  bank  rhetoric  does  not  include  any 
informational value added. In an inflation targeting regime, forecasts are a central tool 
of  central  bank  communication.  For  instance,  Hoeberitchts  et  al.  (2009),  show  that 
transparency  about  the  central  bank's  forecasting  procedures
  improves  output 
stabilization  and  Geraats  (2001  and  2005)  shows  that  transparency  helps  to  build 
reputation and so the publication of internal forecasts provides more accurate signals of 
central bank’s intentions, enhancing the effectiveness of monetary policy by quickly 
exposing  any  bias  towards  inflationary  policies  and  thus  exerting  a  disciplinary 
influence on central banks. Albeit expectations are known to be a crucial determinant of 
                                                              
2 Certain theoretical papers [e.g., Amato et al. (2002), Morris and Shin (2002) and Woodford (2005), which discusses 
the  social  value  of  public  information]  conclude  that  too  much  information  provided  by  the  central  bank  is 
detrimental to welfare. Specifically, the greater the precision of the agent’s private information, the more likely it is 
that increased provision of public information lowers social welfare. The detrimental effect of public information 
arises from the fact that agents overreact to public information, placing too much weight on the public signal relative 
to weights that would be used by the social planner (the central bank). That is, the information provided by central 
banks  might  crowd  out  independent  information  acquisition  by  the  private  sector,  which  carries  the  risk  of  an 
inefficiently low level of information acquisition. Nevertheless, this possibility has been deemed implausible in the 
real world by Svensson (2006). According to this author, many conclusions about the value of transparency appear to 
hinge on the exact specification and parameterisation of the theoretical models. For instance, Svensson (2006) argues 
that Amato et al. (2002) findings have been misinterpreted as anti-transparency results, whereas they are actually pro 
transparency and several other authors show that transparency is welfare-increasing in more general models [e.g., 
Roca (2005) and Hellwig (2005)].      6
economic  dynamics,  there’s  a  theoretical  debate  on  the  implications  of  releasing 
information, with some literature stating  that communication  of information doesn’t 
seem to improve public agents’ ability to forecast (e.g., Amador and Weill, 2008). As 
stated by Blinder (2009, p. 3), a central bank should perhaps be wary of talking about 
issues  on  which  it  receives  noisy  signals,  such  as  the  evolution  of  the  economy. 
Nevertheless,  there  has  been  a  growing  consensus  that  better  communication  about 
central bank actions is essential in reducing the uncertainty facing economic agents. As 
argued by Woodford (2003), successful monetary policy is not so much a matter of 
effective control over overnight interest rates as it is of shaping market expectations of 
the future evolution of key economic and financial variables.    
 
 
3. Central bank forecasts  
 
The  historical  decline  in  macroeconomic  volatility,  documented  first  by  Kim  and 
Nelson (1999), McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Blanchard and Simon (2001) and 
Cogley  and  Sargent  (2005),  was  often  referred  to  as  the  “Great  Moderation”  and 
appeared to hold across a wide number of sectors and countries (see Stock and Watson, 
2003 and 2007). Specifically, inflation and GDP processes in G7 countries moderated in 
the late 1980s and their volatility has been falling further most of the time until recently. 
The explanations to that period differ widely, going from wiser policies to sheer good 
luck. Nevertheless, those days are surely gone because two years after the beginning of 
the  financial  and  economic  turmoil  brought  up  by  the  2007  sub-prime  crisis,  we 
definitely can’t speak of “moderation”
3.  
As  stated  by  Blinder  et  al.  (2008),  another  important  aspect  of  a  central  bank’s 
communication strategy is the extent and content of any forward-looking information it 
provides.  This  information  set  includes  the  central  bank’s  assessment  (forecast)  of 
future  inflation  and  economic  activity,  and  its  own  inclinations  regarding  future 
monetary policy decisions. Note that, central banks deal with the potential misreading 
of their interest forecasts as an unconditional commitment by revealing the assumptions, 
risks and uncertainties surrounding the forecast. In particular, and as we said in the last 
                                                              
3 Also, the idea that forecasts would be easier to make was rapidly abandoned and replaced by a continuous update of 
the numbers.   7
section, the information may be falsely understood by financial markets as implying 
explicit commitments on behalf of central banks, rather than conditional commitments 
that  may  have  to  be  altered,  sometimes  even  radically  if  underlying  economic 
conditions change. 
Central banks differ sharply in whether and how they communicate forward-looking 
information,  including  forecasts  of  future  inflation,  forecasts  of  future  economic 
activity, and inclinations regarding future monetary policy
4. But how explicit should a 
central bank be in this regard? Many central banks publish their staff projections about 
key economic variables (e.g., economic growth and inflation), and some also reveal 
explicit inflation projections. Others have even gone so far as to provide an explicit 
forecast  of  their  likely  path  of  future  monetary  policy  rates
5.  While  more  explicit 
information  may  help  guide  financial  markets,  there  are  several  risks  behind  such 
communication  strategies  (see  Mishkin,  2007).  Inflation-targeting  central  banks 
typically provide their assessment of expected future inflation in periodic reports
6. One 
approach to presenting monetary analysis to the public is to subsume the information 
derived from it into a single presentational device, such as a published inflation forecast, 
projection or fan chart (ECB, 2001a). This approach can be justified on the grounds that 
emphasizing  developments  in  individual  indicators  (possibly  including  monetary 
variables) only adds unnecessary complexity to the presentation of monetary policy and 
potentially  distracts  the  public  from  the  central  bank’s  primary  objective.  While 
subsuming the information from monetary analysis into an inflation forecast may help 
to focus the public’s attention on the maintenance of price stability, it inevitably makes 
the  impact  of  various  forms  of  analysis,  including  monetary  analysis,  on  policy 
decisions difficult to see. Thus greater clarity about the objective of monetary policy is 
achieved  only  at  the  expense  of  reduced  transparency  about  the  role  of  individual 
                                                              
4 Jeanneau (2009) presents an extensive survey on central bank procedures on this topic, concluding that from the 32 
surveyed central banks, 84% release an economic forecast, typically in one of their regular publications.  
 
5 Some monetary economists, such as Svensson (2002), have argued that full transparency would require a projection 
of the policy rate path and a release of the so called “objective function” of the central bank. Nevertheless, it would 
be difficult to condense all the complexities of policymaking into a simple and easily communicable function. Others, 
such as Woodford (2008), see the projection of the path as a prerequisite for consistency once forecasts of the 
inflation rate and the output gap are published. 
6 Several papers document the quantitative effects of inflation targeting. Kuttner and Posen (2001) document that 
inflation targeting reduces the persistence of inflation. Johnson (2002) finds that the level of expected inflation in 
targeting countries falls after the announcement of targets and Levin et al. (2004) find that inflation targeting is 
effective in anchoring inflation expectations. Taking the literature with a grain of salt, there is some evidence that 
since  the  early  nineties  the  volatility  of  inflation  has  narrowed  particularly  for  inflation-targeting  countries, 
suggesting that inflation targeters may have become more successful at containing shocks hitting the economy, albeit 
there were differences in initial conditions of adopters and non-adopters (see Truman, 2003).   8
variables – including monetary aggregates – in monetary policy decisions. Two of the 
most advanced central banks in terms of publishing forecasts are the Bank of England 
and the Federal Reserve. 
The Bank of England’s display of probability distributions through fan charts has many 
imitators
7. An important aspect of the Bank of England approach is that the Monetary 
Policy Committee (MPC) best collective projections for inflation and GDP growth are 
not point forecasts but probability distributions, presented in the form of fan charts. The 
width of each chart represents a measure of the MPC’s overall degree of uncertainty 
about  the  outlook.  How  far  the  bands  stretch  out  on  one  side  of  the  central  band 
compared with the other – the skew of the distribution – is determined by an assessment 
of the balance of risks
8. However, central banks that are not inflation targeters also often 
release (some aspects of) their inflation forecasts. The Federal Reserve keeps its staff 
projections secret, but it now publishes FOMC forecasts of inflation four times a year. 
The  November  2007  changes  in  its  communication  practices  increased  both  the 
frequency  and  length  of  its  publicly-released  forecasts  (Bernanke,  2007).  Although 
these changes did not include the adoption of an explicit inflation target, the new three-
year-ahead forecast effectively reveals the inflation rate that policymakers believe is 
consistent with the Fed’s mandate to achieve “stable prices”. Notice that, Sellon (2008) 
presents evidence for the United States that more explicit guidance about the future path 
of  the  federal  funds  rate  has  led  to  an  improvement  in  private  sector  forecasts  of 
monetary policy. Until recently, the diversity across central banks was even wider when 
it came to forecasting real output. However, the Fed has recently joined the Bank of 







                                                              
7 Jeanneau (2009, p. 23), states that “two fifths of central banks publish a range of numbers and another two fifths 
make public fan-charts. Ranges and fan-charts are more intensively used by inflation targeters in emerging market 
economies, perhaps reflecting the larger variance of output observed in such economies.”   
8 Goodhart (2001) and Mishkin (2007) have argued against announcing a projected path for the policy rate on the 
grounds that it may complicate the committee’s decision-making process. It may also complicate communication 
with the public, which might fail to understand the conditional nature of the projection (Issing, 2005). To guard 
against  these  potential  pitfalls,  all  central  banks  that  provide  forward  guidance  on  interest  rates  emphasise  that 
forward-looking assessments are always conditional on current information and therefore subject to change.   9
 
4. The Eurosystem and ECB staff projections 
 
In  December  2000,  the  Governing  Council  of  the  ECB  has  decided  to  publish 
Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area
9. The Eurosystem staff 
macroeconomic projections are produced jointly by experts from the ECB and the euro 
area NCBs and serve as an input to the Governing Council’s discussions, but need not 
be  endorsed  by  it,  which  differs  from  inflation  forecasts  in  an  inflation  targeting 
strategy. The ECB staff macroeconomic projections complement the projections from 
the Eurosystem so that, twice a year (ECB projections in March and September and 
Eurosystem  projections  in  June  and  December),  both  publish  macroeconomic 
projections for the euro area, which are a key element in sharpening the assessment of 
macroeconomic developments. Those projections are also an input into the Governing 
Council’s assessment of economic developments and the risks to price stability. Since 
September 2004 the ECB staff projections, including a summary description, have also 
been published in the Monthly Bulletin
10.  
The  published  figures  include  projections  for  inflation  in  terms  of  the  Harmonized 
Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), the growth of real GDP and its main expenditure 
components  over  a  two-year  horizon
11.  The  projections  are  accompanied  by  a 
description of their main features. In order to reflect the degree of uncertainty attached 
to such exercises, the Governing Council decided to publish the projections in the form 
of ranges. The method used is documented in ECB (2008), with the ranges for each 
variable and each horizon corresponding to a model-based 75% probability interval
12. 
Given the prevailing exceptional economic and financial circumstances, the ECB states 
that the uncertainty surrounding the projections is larger than usual. 
According to the ECB (ECB, 2001b), within the second pillar of its monetary policy 
strategy, the Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections play an important role as a 
                                                              
9 Jeanneau (2009, p. 20), in his survey of 32 central banks, reports that this type of forecasts, which are a mean of 
distancing the views of the policymakers from the assumptions and uncertainty embedded in the projected outlook, 
are less frequent. In most cases, central banks that publish an official view do not produce a separate staff forecast.  
10  See  Blinder  (2009,  p.  15),  for  a  discussion  around  the  question  if  should  be  released  the  monetary  policy 
committee’s own projection or the staff’s forecast.  
11 Jeanneau (2009, p. 23) shows that around one fifth of central bank’s forecasts are published with a horizon of up to 
one year, nearly two fifths are published with a one to two year range and another two fifths push out beyond two 
years, with inflation targeters more heavily represented in this last group.     
12 For more information on the procedures and techniques used please see ECB (2001b and 2008). Jeanneau (2009, p. 
24), states that in addition to the output of forecasts, the majority of central banks surveyed also publish in depth 
information (e.g., on the underlying data, the equations and the parameters) on the forecasting models they use.   10
tool for aggregating and organizing existing information on current and future economic 
developments. Conditioned on a set of assumptions, they provide projections for a range 
of  macroeconomic  variables,  combining  the  results  of  conventional  models  with 
economic experts’ knowledge. 
 
 
5. Data evolution and forecast performance 
 
5.1 Data and ECB performance 
 
In this section we analyze the Eurosystem and ECB staff macroeconomic projections, 
considering the data from December 2000 to December 2009. The considered period 
includes the last couple of years, with the turbulence in financial and economic markets 
that followed the “great moderation” period. So, that should have made the forecasters’ 
task more difficult. 
 
The  following  figures  report  the  HICP  and  GDP  evolution  in  euro  area  since  the 
beginning of the monetary union
13. 
Figure 1 - HICP 
 
Source: ECB - Annualized monthly percentage changes 
                                                              
13 The percentage changes are based on a euro area composition and the data for real GDP refer to working-day-
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recent surge in consumer prices when we consider the broad index or th
Source: ECB – annualized quarterly percentage changes.
 
Now, we are going to analyze ECB’s forecast performance in terms of HICP inflation 
and  GDP  growth  and  later  we 
institutions. 
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For legibility reasons we consider only in Figure 3 all the December projections made 
for the following two years, beginning in 1999. The light dashed line represents the 
projection’s upper limit and the bold dashed line the lower limit. The continuous line 
represents the actual values for the HICP growth. As we can see, the ECB seems to 
consistently underestimate the HICP inflation rate since the actual values are always 
closer to the upper limits.  
Figure 4 presents the same analysis for GDP growth. Interestingly, we note that the 
ECB overestimates the figures, with its projections appearing closer to the lower limit. 
Exceptions are the projections made in December 2005 for the years 2006 and 2007, 
which were surprisingly positive years. 
Figure 4 
 
Source: ECB and own calculations. 
 
Several systematic errors have been reported in the literature. For instance, Granger 
(1996),  using  data  from  an  international  survey  of  forecasters,  presents  evidence 
supporting  the  idea  that  output  is  generally  underestimated  in  an  upswing  and 
overestimated  during  a  contraction  period  and  Loungani  (2001)  also  reports  that 
forecasters regularly miss recessions. Also, Döpke and Fritsche (2005) evidences that 
German forecasters tended to underestimate inflation. 
To better highlight those differences we present in Table 1 the errors and mean square 
















Table 1: Errors and Mean Square Errors for Eurosystem/ ECB staff forecasts for HICP and GDP 
n+1  n+2 
HICP   GDP   HICP   GDP  
Dez-00  0,20  -1,60  0,40  -2,10 
Dez-01  0,70  -0,30  0,60  -2,00 
Dez-02  0,30  -1,10  0,50  -0,60 
Dez-03  0,30  0,20  0,60  -0,90 
Dez-04  0,20  -0,40  0,60  0,70 
Dez-05  0,10  1,00  0,10  0,70 
Dez-06  0,10  0,40  1,40  -1,70 
Dez-07  0,80  -1,5  -1,50  -6 
Dez-08  -1,10  -3,4  ...  ... 
MSE  0,29  2,11  0,71  6,18 
Source: ECB and own calculations. 
 
As we can see, the ECB has a better performance on HICP growth rate projections, 
overstating the GDP growth, which displays a much greater volatility. 
The following figure presents the mean square errors committed each quarter by the 
ECB staff/ Eurosystem forecasts, comparing the annual forecasts with the final values 
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Figure 5 presents also a simple moving average of the MSE committed. As we can see, 
in the low volatility period of 2002-2006, the errors were small, with the financial crisis 
serious effects over the economy being totally missed. 
Also, we see if the ECB has somehow improved the accuracy of its projections over the 
years. As  we can see from Figures  6 and 7, the ECB  seemed to  be improving  the 
accuracy of the HICP and GDP growth rate projections, albeit made some great errors 
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ECB’s  forecasting  errors  are  understandable  given  the  many  short  term  drivers  of 
growth and inflation that are outside the central bank’s control, particularly, in periods 
of macroeconomic and financial instability. In the next section we investigate if the 
other forecasters committed the same errors. 
 
5.2 Comparison with other forecasters 
 
A  number  of  forecasts  for  the  euro  area  are  available  from  both  international 
organizations and private sector institutions. However, these forecasts are not strictly 
comparable with one another or with the Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections, 
as they were finalized at different points in time. Additionally, they use different (partly 
unspecified) methods to derive assumptions for fiscal, financial and external variables, 
including oil and other commodity prices. Finally, there are differences in working-day 
adjustment methods across different forecasts. 
In  a  simple  comparison  between  the  Eurosystem  and  ECB  projections  with  other 
forecasts  we  try  to  infer  if  the  ECB  has  a  greater  accuracy  and  if  so,  a  possible 
informational advantage over private forecasters
14.   
We compare the forecasts for euro area HICP inflation and real GDP growth from the 
ECB or the Eurosystem with forecasts made by the European Commission (EC), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), the Consensus Economics Forecasts (CEF) and the Survey of 







                                                              
14 Romer and Romer (2000) is a seminal paper on this theme and Baghestani (2008) and Boero et al. (2008) are some 
recent examples.   16
Table 2: Mean Square Errors for forecasts for HICP and GDP from other institutions  
 
n+1  n+2 
HICP  GDP  HICP  GDP 
EC  1,03  4,08  1,30  9,91 
IMF  0,92  3,24  n.a.  n.a. 
OECD  0,39  2,76  1,41  9,59 
CEF  0,82  3,61  n.a.  n.a. 
SPF  0,94  8,36  1,26  10,08 
ECB  0,29  2,11  0,71  6,18 
 
 
Table 3: Root Mean Square Errors of other forecasters  
n+1   n+2 
HICP  GDP  HICP  GDP 
EC  1,01  2,02  1,14  3,15 
IMF  0,96  1,80  n.a.  n.a. 
OECD  0,62  1,66  1,19  3,10 
CEF  0,91  1,90  n.a.  n.a. 
SPF  0,97  2,89  1,12  3,17 
ECB  0,54  1,45  0,84  2,49 
Source: ECB and own calculations. 
 
Tables 2 and 3 present the MSE and Root Mean Square Errors (RMSE) for ECB and 
other institutions. As we can see, the ECB shows a performance clearly different from 
its five peers. Either in short-term projections (one year) or medium-term (two years), 
the  ECB  always  commits  fewer  errors.  Only  the  OECD  approaches  the  ECB 
performance in short-term projections. In the two year projections, the ECB presents an 
even better performance in terms of HICP inflation rate but, as the others, very poor in 
terms of GDP growth. 
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In short, the ECB has a somehow good performance in HICP growth projections and a 
poor performance in GDP growth projections. Nevertheless, the ECB’s performance is 
undoubtedly superior to the other forecasters. So, this signals a possible informational 
advantage from the ECB, possible due to the advanced knowledge of the future policy 
path or the availability of data that confers him a specific expertness on that field.  
Making a final reference to the question of disagreement among forecasters, a recent 
paper by Dovern et al. (2009), which investigates determinants of disagreement about 
six key economic indicators in G7 countries roughly over the past twenty years, finds 
that disagreement about variables such as GDP intensifies strongly during recessions, 
whereas disagreement about variables such as the inflation rate rises with its level and is 
considerably lower under independent central banks
15. Also, the finding in that paper 
that cross-sectional dispersion increases with the uncertainty about the underlying actual 
indicators seems well suited with our finding that in uncertain times the committed 
errors and the disagreement between forecasters increases.  
We think that our results show two clear areas of development: on one hand, increase 
accuracy  in  measuring  the  differences  between  forecasters  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
understand the determinants of disagreement between economic agents





It is worth to emphasize that our findings should not be interpreted as suggestive that 
forecasting by central banks and, in particular, other institutions, can be regarded as 
unimportant in modern policy making. If central banks are relatively systematic in their 
policymaking, exhibit rule-like behavior  over time, and provide values for potential 
output and the inflation target, along with forecasts of output and inflation, they may 
indeed offer sufficient information for financial markets to construct likely paths for 
their policy rates. Notice that the publication of projected paths for the central bank’s 
policy rates is a new practice that appears to be the “new frontier” in central bank 
communication  albeit  its  effects  must  be  more  deeply  researched.  Nevertheless,  the 
                                                              
15 Ehrmann et al. (2010) also find evidence for a significant and sizeable effect of central bank transparency on 
forecast dispersion. Specifically, that paper finds empirical evidence that the announcement of a quantified inflation 
objective and enhanced transparency about economic dimensions of the conduct of monetary policy, such as the 
release of the central bank’s internal forecasts of inflation and output, reduce forecast disagreement.    
16 On these topics, see e.g. Fujiwara (2005), D’Amico and Orphanides (2008) and Dovern et al. (2009). For instance, 
Fujiwara (2005) examines how a central bank’s economic forecasts affect forecasts by professional forecasters and 
vice-versa, looking at the case of the Bank of Japan.   18
problem  is  when  these  forecasts  commit  systematic  errors.  In  that  case,  we  should 
question the added value of such forecasts. We are aware that the small set of data 
inhibits a full fledged research on the ECB forecasts’ accuracy. This paper is a work in 
progress since we intend to further develop it extending the range of data analyzed and 
improving the methodology to assess forecast performance. Further, the comparison 
between forecasters and the study of the determinants of disagreement between them 
also deserve more research.  
Notice that, in the last ten years, the ECB has been successful in attaining its price 
stability objective. So, the occurrence of errors with its forecasts doesn’t seem to impact 
that success. This question is important because, albeit not visible, the forecasting errors 
jeopardize ECB’s credibility. The kind of public criticism faced by the central bank 
should the forecast turn out to be widely off the mark, which is a rather likely result 
given the many short term drivers of growth inflation that are outside the central bank’s 
control, could be avoided if the ECB simply let forecasts for the others. This change 
should naturally be weighted against the benefits of publishing forecasts and we think 
the  ECB  should  undertake  this  internal  reflection,  particularly  with  respect  to  GDP 
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